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A COMMENT ON THE IMPACT OF SHAFFER V.
HEITNER IN THE CLASSROOM
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL*
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Shaffer v. Heitner' presents a
substantial challenge to law school professors who teach the fundamen-
tals of jurisdiction over persons and property in civil procedure or
conflicts of law courses; it is a source of both confusion and delight.
The confusion stems from the fact that the opinions2 are so encompass-
ing and affect so many aspects of the subject that one does not know
where or how to introduce the case. But this broad scope is what
makes the case so interesting; at the same time that it settles some of the
old questions concerning the appropriate constitutional boundaries of a
state's powers, it raises new inquiries that will occupy those in the field
for a long time.
Most,3 though not all,4 civil procedure casebooks introduce the con-
cepts of personal jurisdiction through discussion of Pennoyer v. Neff,
that old and venerable "friend" to generations of law students and at-
torneys. In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court defined the scope of a state's
power under the fourteenth amendment to reach all persons or prop-
erty found within the state, but not to reach beyond the state's borders.
The case has been valuable as a pedagogical tool as well as a means of
providing a base for the study of the subsequent expansion of state
power under the federal Constitution and new state statutory schemes.
The majority opinion in Shaffer, however, casts considerable doubt on
* Professor of Law, Stanford University School of Law. A.B., 1953, Stanford University;
LL.B., 1958, Harvard Law School.
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. The case consists of four opinions. Id. at 186 (opinion of the Court); id. at 217 (Powell,
J., concurring); id. (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring).
3. P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE 861-70 (2d ed. 1977); J. COUND, J.
FRIEDENTHAL, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 65-71 (2d ed. 1974); R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 657-64 (3d ed. 1973); J. MCCOID, CIVIL PROCEDURE 498-510 (1974); M. Ro-
SENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMIT, & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 251-54 (3d ed.
1976); A. SCOTT & R. KENT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 338-43 (1967).
4. Eg., J. CHADBOURN, A. LEVIN, & P. SHUCHMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 20, 55-59 (2d ed.
1974).
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Pennoyer's continuing validity. Shaffer not only eliminates the mere
presence of property as a basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction, but ap-
pears also to undermine, if not destroy, the notion that the mere pres-
ence of a transient individual in the forum state at the time of service of
process justifies the court's assumption of jurisdiction.6 Arguably, then,
Pennoyer should be relegated to a short paragraph of "historical
background."
On the other hand, because so many law teachers have found the
analysis of Pennoyer useful, especially in first year courses, a large ma-
jority are likely to continue discussing the case. They will rely on the
Court's reference to the fact that plaintiff "did not allege and does not
now claim that. . .[defendants] have ever set foot in Delaware, ' '7 to
justify an argument that jurisdiction based on mere presence is not yet
dead. Nevertheless, students should be warned that Shaffer raises seri-
ous questions regarding the continuing vitality of Pennoyer.
Assuming that law professors will retain Pennoyer as the lead case,
it 'might seem logical to turn to Shaffer immediately thereafter. This
would have two advantages. First, the unease of dealing with
Pennoyer at the outset would be short lived. Second, the artificiality
of discussing before Shaffer numerous other cases in which jurisdiction
is based on the defendant's mere presence would be eliminated.8 Such
cases include old favorites in which defendant's presence in the forum
was procured by fraud,9 force,10 or trickery,'" or in which defendant's
6. The Court's basic decision was that the minimum contacts standard, already applicable
to in personam jurisdiction, must now apply to quasi in rem jurisdiction as well. As the Court
recognized, the effect of applying the standard to in personam cases has been to increase the scope
of the states' powers over nonresidents. 433 U.S. at 204. The Shaffer decision is the first to
apply the standards to decrease jurisdiction as it had traditionally been allowed. If the same
standards are applicable to persons and to property, the elimination of jurisdiction based on the
mere presence of property would logically dictate the elimination of jurisdiction based solely on
the transient presence of the defendant.
7. Id. at 213.
8. This problem is, of course, eliminated if the cases are discussed as a unit after the cases
dealing with state power. See J. CotUD, J. FRiEDENTHAL, & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 160-78.
But sometimes these cases are handled almost immediately after Pennoyer. See, e.g., P. CAR-
RINGTON & B. BABcoCK, supra note 3, at 876-84; M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEuiN, H. SMIT, & H.
KORN, supra note 3, at 254-59.
9. E.g., Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1937);
Willametz v. Susi, 54 F.R.D. 463 (D. Mass. 1972).
10. E.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1974); State ex rel. Sivnksty v.
Duffield, 137 W. Va. 112, 71 S.E.2d 113 (1952).
11. E.g., Nowell v. Nowell, 24 Conn. Supp. 314, 190 A.2d 233 (1963); Tickle v. Barton, 142
W. Va. 188, 95 S.E.2d 427 (1956). Cf. Siro v. American Express Co., 99 Conn. 95, 121 A. 280
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voluntary entry into the forum state arguably was so within the public
interest that he or she should be immune from service of process. 2
Despite these advantages, however, full consideration of Shaffer im-
mediately after Pennoyer would be premature. The Shaffer Court
based its decision on the "minimum contacts" standard for testing the
validity of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents. That standard
cannot be understood without a substantial explanation of its meaning
and development. This could be accomplished, of course, merely by
reading several long notes following Pennoyer. Although this ap-
proach may be sufficient for second and third year students, it would
be unfortunate in a first year course for several reasons. First, to ap-
preciate Shaffer fully a student must be familiar with the struggle to
develop a rational standard illustrated by the line of cases leading to,13
and past, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 4 which first formally
adopted the "minimum contacts" standard. Second, and even more
important, Shaffer presents to first year students an opportunity to
study the way in which common law techniques result in the develop-
ment of new principles of law, even in the interpretation of the federal
Constitution. Starting with a series of principles born of logic and ne-
cessity, courts struggled to make the existing law responsive to a set of
radically changing circumstances by relying on such twists, turns, and
legal fictions as they could muster. Thus, through artificial interpreta-
tions of "presence" and "consent,"' 5 courts substantially expanded
their powers over nonresidents until, as a pragmatic matter, a new set
of principles emerged. Once these new tenets were sufficiently estab-
lished, the Supreme Court, with the confidence exhibited in Interna-
tional Shoe in 1945, swept away the fictions and formally recognized
the newly developed law. Following a thirty-two year period during
which these principles matured through the process of legislative 6 and
(1923) (attachment of defendant's property by purchasing it from an agent, held: not fraud or
trickery).
12. Eg, St. John v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App.2d 794, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1960); Mattison
v. Lichyter, 162 Cal. App. 2d 60, 327 P.2d 599 (1958).
13. The most popular cases are Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (nonresident motor
vehicle statute), and Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (action against
nonresident stockbroker involving sale of securities in forum state).
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla"4 Review, 25 U. CHL L. REv. 569 (1958).
16. See Currie, The Growth of the Long Arnr Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois,
1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Developments in the Law-StateCourt Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909
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judicial 7 tinkering, the Supreme Court in Shaffer once again made a
major alteration; it now relied on its newly developed principles to
challenge the continuing validity of the original ground of presence as
a basis for personal jurisdiction. This is the poetry of law develop-
ment, a part of fundamental legal education that should not be elimi-
nated, even in the face of pressure to review an ever expanding number
of cases and issues.
Even though Shaffer should not be studied at the outset of the per-
sonal jurisdiction material, it must be examined in detail during the
discussion of quasi in rem jurisdiction. This is the area upon which it
has the greatest and most direct impact. Undoubtedly Shaffer will be
substituted for the leading quasi in rem case, Harris v. Balk,18 which
Shaffer directly overruled. 9 Although Harris should not be eliminated
entirely because it provides the straw man by which the full
significance of Shaffer can be appreciated, its facts can be presented in
a brief note preceding Shaffer.
The Shaffer opinions could command substantial classroom analysis,
especially in attempting to decide what is or is not left of quasi in rem
jurisdiction. There are many avenues of interest: Should it make a
difference if real rather than personal property is involved?20 What if
the property seized had been the stock certificates themselves rather
than the abstract value of that portion of the corporation attributed to
the defendants, and said to be situated in Delaware solely because that
was the state of incorporation?2 1 Would it make a difference, as the
majority opinion seems to suggest,2 2 if Delaware had enacted a set of
jurisdictional statutes indicating a felt need to protect state interests?
What activities constitute sufficient contacts with the forum to justify
quasi in rem jurisdiction?2 These questions are, of course, more than
(1960); Note, The Development of In Personam Jurisdiction Over Individuals and Corporations in
California: 1849-1970, 21 HASTINGS LJ. 1105 (1970).
17. See authorities cited in notes 15-16 supra. See also Carrington & Martin, Substantive
Interests and the Jurisdiction ofState Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 227 (1967).
18. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
19. 433 U.S. at 208-12. Those who do not teach Harris immediately after Pennoyer, see P.
CARIUNGTON & B. BABcocK, supra note 3, at 864-73, will probably find it necessary to reorganize
their materials. Harris, like Pennoyer, dealt only with situs of the property as a basis for jurisdic-
tion, whereas Shaffer, as we have seen, relies on the development of entirely different criteria.
See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
20. See 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
21. See id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. See id. at 208-09.
23. See id. at 214-15.
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of mere academic interest. Every lecturer on the subject will be re-
quired to monitor the advance sheets to determine the directions the
courts will be taking. Already some fascinating cases have arisen.
One such case, Omni Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Actividades Aereas
Aragonesas, S.A. ,24 is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. In that
action, plaintiff, a United States corporation, had entered into a con-
tract in France and Spain to purchase several jet aircraft from defend-
ants, all foreign nationals. Defendants subsequently notified plaintiff
that they would not make delivery. Thereafter the parties entered into
a second, compromise contract that contained a clause conferring ex-
clusive jurisdiction on the federal district court for the District of Co-
lumbia over any disputes arising out of the contract. Defendants
failed to make delivery once again and plaintiff sued for breach of the
second contract in the District of Columbia. Except for one jet engine
brought to Arizona for repair, defendants owned no property in the
United States. Therefore, primarily to protect its ability to enforce a
judgment in this country, plaintiff filed a quasi in rem action in the
Arizona federal court, attaching the engine. The district court dis-
missed the suit holding that Shaffer controlled.25 Plaintiffiargues on
appeal that as to the initial contract, the Arizona court should have the
power to accept quasi in rem jurisdiction "by necessity;" 26 otherwise,
suit could only be brought in a court of a foreign country, in which
enforcement of the contract would be uncertain. Although plaintiff
concedes it has no specific authority for its position, it notes that the
majority opinion in Shaffer specifically left open the question whether
presence of property is a sufficient contact "where no other forum is
available to plaintiff."'27 Even if such jurisdiction by necessity would
be proper, it is questionable whether courts of foreign nations should
be treated as "no other forum" for this purpose.
In addition, plaintiff argues that the Arizona federal court should be
able to accept quasi in rem jurisdiction in an action brought to secure
enforcement of the District of Columbia in personam action.28 Of
course, the Arizona court would have to require an appropriate preat-
24. No. 77-4012 (9th Cir., filed Dec. 27, 1977).
25. No. 77-4012 (D. Ariz., Nov. 15, 1977).
26. Brief for Appellant, Omni Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Actividades Aereas Aragonesas, S.A.,
No. 77-4012 (9th Cir., filed Dec. 27, 1977), at 29-32.
27. 433 U.S. at 211 n. 37.
28. Brief for Appellant, Omni Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Actividades Aereas Aragonesas, S.A.,
No. 77-4012 (9th Cir., filed Dec. 27, 1977), at 18-29.
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tachment hearing to determine the need for such protection. This as-
pect of the case would normally fit into the discussion of prejudgment
remedies and the Supreme Court's struggle to determine the safeguards
necessary to protect a defendant's rights before his property interests
are subject to interference.29 At least one federal district court deter-
mined that such an attachment was necessary to secure a possible judg-
ment being sought in another forum and that Shaffer did not prevent
assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction for that purpose.3 0  These "reme-
dial" problems are extremely important. If resolved to permit jurisdic-
tion "by necessity" in a broad range of cases, then quasi in rem
jurisdiction is far from moribund, even in a Harris v. Balk situation.
One of the most intriguing questions is whether Shaffer will affect
cases such as Seider v. Roth,3' which have used a fictionalized version
of quasi in rem jurisdiction to allow suit in any state where defendant's
insurer can be found by attaching the insurance policy covering the loss
which is the subject of plaintiffs action. Theoretically, these are not
quasi in rem situations at all because the "property" allegedly attached
does not exist until after liability is assessed against defendant. 2
Before that time the policy has no intrinsic value. In Seider and simi-
-lar cases, courts twisted the quasi in rem device to create "direct ac-
tions" against insurers in the absence of legislation.33 It is not at all
clear that assertion of jurisdiction-at least in the state where the in-
surer has its principal place of business-would not meet the minimum
standard, provided that an appropriate state statute would so permit. 4
It is important to recognize that Shaffer-s impact extends beyond the
issue of a state's power to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents and their
property. The case will undoubtedly have an impact on the problems
of notice and the right to be heard, both for what the opinions say and
for what they omit. The Delaware court, from whose decision the ap-
29. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
30. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, No. 77-0123 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 26, 1977).
31. 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 216 N.E. 2d 312, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1966). See Stein, Jurisdiction by
Attachment ofLiability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1075 (1968).
32. Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1916) (interpleader of
claimants to an insurance contract).
33. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110, 112 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 396
U.S. 844 (1969).
34. Cf. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957) (Californiajurisdic-
tion over a New York trustee based on the trustee's significant contacts with California), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
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peal was taken, barely touched on the issues which the Supreme Court
decided;35 instead it focused on whether the standards of notice and
right to a hearing attending a pretrial attachment to secure a potential
judgment36 also applied to an attachment to obtain quasi in rem juris-
diction. In addition, the lower court discussed at length whether the
specific Delaware statutory procedure met the due process require-
ments established in other attachment cases.37 Although the Supreme
Court did not resolve these issues, the majority opinion raises doubts as
to the validity of the Delaware procedure.38
A similar problem exists with respect to the absence in Delaware of a
limited appearance provision, whereby an owner, whose property has
been seized to provide the court with jurisdiction, may fight the action
on the merits without being subjected to in personam jurisdiction. The
implications of the Shaffer case in the Delaware courts prior to
Supreme Court reversal were alarming. Any person who owned stock
of any Delaware corporation could be sued in the Delaware courts.3 9 If
the owner failed to appear, the stock was lost by default; if the owner
appeared to fight the case, he or she automatically submitted to in per-
sonam jurisdiction even though Delaware had no other relationship to
the defendant or the cause of action.4 This state of affairs may have
prompted the Supreme Court's interest in the case. The decision
leaves open the question whether any kinds of quasi in rem jurisdiction
still allowable after Shaffer will be valid in the absence of defendant's
right to make a limited appearance.
Finally, Shaffer lends itself to consideration of several jurispruden-
tial questions not directly involved with the Court's reasoning. The
first concerns the majority's conclusion that sufficient minimum con-
tacts with Delaware did not exist to permit jurisdiction, even though
that issue had not been considered by the Delaware courts and there
35. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976), rev'dsub non Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
36. Id. at 230-32. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
37. See the discussion of the Delaware state court opinions in 433 U.S. at 193-95.
38. See id. at 194 n.10.
39. Delaware is the only state which "treats the place of incorporation as the situs of the
stock, even though both the owner and the custodian of the shares are elsewhere." Id. at 218
(Stevens, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 218-19.
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was no record or opportunity for plaintiff to discover and present evi-
dence on the matter. As noted by Justice Brennan in dissent:
[T]he Court's ruling is a constitutional one and necessarily will affect the
reach of the jurisdictional laws of all 50 states. Ordinarily this would
counsel restraint in constitutional pronouncements . . . .Certainly it
should have cautioned the Court against reaching out to decide a question
that, as here, has yet to emerge from the state courts ripened for review on
the federal issue.41
It is interesting to speculate why the Court did not return the case to
the Delaware state courts for a hearing on the matter. It is also interest-
ing to speculate why, having made his point, Justice Brennan went on
to find that the available evidence established sufficient minimum con-
tacts to permit jurisdiction. By doing so, he may have given more force
to the majority's position than if he had joined Justice Stevens, who,
concurring, simply noted his "uncertainty as to the reach of the [major-
ity] opinion. '42
A related matter of interest is the Court's failure to discuss the case's
impact on anyone other than the named defendants. As noted above,
the Court did not dwell on problems plaintiff might have had in find-
ing an alternative forum, or on problems that could arise in future cases
that might result in a serious imbalance between the interests of plain-
tiffs and defendants. Suppose, for example, that defendants were all
residents of a foreign country and had committed the alleged acts
outside the borders of the United States. Should the operation of juris-
dictional standards be unaffected by this or other factors such as the
nature of the substantive claim? By ignoring these issues and deciding
the case without benefit of a full development of the facts, the Supreme
Court adopted a mechanical approach itself worthy of classroom
exploration.
When one assesses the broad reach of Shaffer-the issues it handles
and those it merely raises-it is clear that the case will be the focus of
extended classroom discussion for a long period. Inevitably, perhaps
in another twenty or thirty years, the Supreme Court will take another
dramatic turn. Spurred on by the installation of an economical and
speedy intracontinental transportation system, or advanced technology
in the telecommunications industry, the Court will finally decide that
state or even national boundaries no longer serve a useful purpose in
41. Id. at 221-22.
42. Id. at 217-19.
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limiting jurisdiction, and Shaffer will, like those cases it replaces, be
relegated to a mere footnote of history.
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